

REFORMING THE AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (DPD): FROM SYMBOLIC FUNCTION TO SUBSTANTIAL ROLE

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Abstract: *The Regional Representative Council (DPD) is a representative institution established to embody regional representation within Indonesia's constitutional system. However, since its mandate in the amended 1945 Constitution, the role of the DPD remains limited in legislation, oversight, and budgeting. These limitations create an imbalance in the bicameral system, which should ideally maintain equilibrium between regional and central interests. One of the main issues is that the DPD's legislative authority is restricted to proposing and providing considerations without binding power. Furthermore, the DPD's oversight role over regional policies lacks enforcement power, and its budgetary authority is minimal. Additionally, the representation system of the DPD is debated, as each province has the same number of representatives regardless of population size and territorial area, leading to an imbalance in representation. Moreover, there is an overlap in roles between the DPD and the House of Representatives (DPR) in accommodating regional interests, which raises concerns about the DPD's effectiveness. Therefore, legal reforms, including revisions to the MD3 Law and amendments to the 1945 Constitution, are necessary to strengthen the DPD's authority in legislation, oversight, and budgeting. Strengthening the DPD's role is expected to enhance the effectiveness and democracy of regional representation, supporting regional autonomy and a more inclusive national policy. The authority of Indonesia's DPD remains limited, particularly in legislation and oversight, making its role often perceived as symbolic. The imbalance with the DPR and the unproportional representation system weaken its effectiveness in advocating for regional interests. Compared to bicameral systems in other countries, the DPD contributes less in legislation and budgeting. Reform is needed to strengthen the representation and authority of the DPD to make it more effective within the national legislative system.*

Keywords: *Regional Representative Council (DPD), Institutional reform, Imbalance between DPR and DPD, Representation inequality*

INTRODUCTION

The authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) within Indonesia's constitutional framework is highly limited, particularly in the legislative domain. Article 22D of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that the DPD is only responsible for proposing bills, providing recommendations, and overseeing the implementation of laws related to regional interests (A Hamudy & Rifki, 2019). This limited scope stands in stark contrast to the stronger legislative powers typically held by upper houses in bicameral systems in other countries, where such institutions often play a significant role in the law-making process (Gunawan, 2023; Rachmah Wardani, 2023).

The DPD was established as part of the constitutional amendments of 1999–2002, which transformed Indonesia from a unicameral to a bicameral legislative system. This change aimed to enhance the representation of regional interests at the national level. However, the authority of the DPD remains far weaker than that of the House of Representatives (DPR) (A Hamudy & Rifki, 2019; Gandhi, 2020; Dorisara, 2024). The DPD is often perceived as merely a complementary institution that primarily provides input without having the power to independently enact laws (Gunawan et al., 2023; Dorisara, 2024). This limitation has sparked ongoing debates regarding the effectiveness of the DPD and the need for reforms to strengthen its authority to better fulfill its original purpose as a representative of regional interests (Reza, 2020; Asyrofuddin, 2022).

Despite some constitutional strengthening following Constitutional Court rulings that expanded the DPD's role in legislative discussions and the

preparation of the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas), these enhancements have not resulted in substantial legislative authority (Reza, 2020). The DPD's involvement in the legislative process remains largely consultative, without decision-making power to initiate or amend laws independently—an essential function in bicameral systems elsewhere (Gunawan, 2023; Rachmah Wardani, 2023; Asyrofuddin, 2022).

This limitation raises concerns about the DPD's capacity to effectively represent regional interests within Indonesia's overall legislative system (Dorisara, 2024; Suparto, 2021). Moreover, the DPD's authority is often deemed inadequate compared to the DPR, which holds primary legislative power. This imbalance has led to calls for reevaluating the role of the DPD in Indonesia's legislative system to ensure that it can function more effectively in bridging regional aspirations with national policies (Gandhi, 2020; Wardani, 2023; Kosasih, 2024). The DPD's status as a complementary institution, rather than an equal partner in the legislative process, reflects broader challenges within Indonesia's bicameral system that require serious attention and potential reform (Dorisara, 2024; Suparto, 2021). The legislative function of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia demonstrates a significant disparity compared to the House of Representatives (DPR). The DPD is often regarded as having a symbolic role, while substantial legislative power remains concentrated in the DPR. This imbalance stems from the constitutional framework set by the 1945 Constitution, which limits the DPD's authority to a consultative function rather than a decisive legislative role. While the DPD is granted the authority to propose bills and participate in discussions, it lacks the power to

independently enact laws, as this authority is entirely vested in the DPR (Wardani, 2023; Amin, 2023; Zada, 2015). changes have not resulted in substantial enhancements to the DPD's legislative authority. The DPD's involvement in the legislative process remains limited to providing recommendations and participating in discussions, without the power to make binding decisions in law-making (Gandhi, 2020; Bagus Suryawan, 2021; Cipto Handoyo, 2024). This limitation has led to criticisms of the DPD's effectiveness as a legislative body, as its role is often overshadowed by the DPR, which holds primary legislative authority (Fernando & Susilowati, 2023; Zada, 2015).

Constitutional Court rulings have attempted to clarify and strengthen the DPD's position within the legislative framework. However, despite these efforts, the DPD continues to function more as a consultative body rather than an equal partner in the legislative process. The inability of the DPD to meaningfully participate in the decision-making stages of law-making underscores the ongoing challenges in asserting its role within Indonesia's bicameral system (Reza, 2020). Consequently, the DPD's capacity to represent regional interests remains weak, raising concerns about the balance of power within Indonesia's legislative system as a whole (Bakir, 2023; Imran et al., 2020).

The DPD's oversight authority in Indonesia is also limited, hindering its effectiveness in the legislative process. While the DPD is granted the power to oversee the implementation of laws related to regional autonomy, the results of its oversight activities lack binding force. This weakens the DPD's ability to enforce its recommendations and effectively advocate for regional interests

within the national legislative framework (Gunawan et al., 2023; Faiz, 2023). Constitutional provisions, particularly Article 22D of the 1945 Constitution, define the DPD's oversight role but do not grant it the authority to impose sanctions or ensure compliance with its recommendations (Zada, 2015; Gandhi, 2020). As a result, the DPD's oversight function is often perceived as merely consultative, without sufficient power to influence regional policies effectively (Asyrofuddin, 2022).

This limitation has led to calls for reforms aimed at enhancing the DPD's capacity to contribute more meaningfully to governance and regional policy-making (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023; Melati et al., 2021).

Efforts to strengthen the DPD's oversight authority have been discussed, particularly in the context of legislative reforms such as revisions to the MD3 Law (Reza, 2020; Gandhi, 2020). However, these reforms have yet to bring significant changes in strengthening the DPD's ability to enforce its recommendations or hold regional governments accountable for their actions (Faiz, 2023). The lack of enforcement power in the DPD's recommendations further weakens its role as a regional representative body, leading to the perception that the DPD is ineffective in fulfilling its constitutional mandate (Bakir, 2023).

To address these challenges, reforms are needed to grant the DPD greater authority in carrying out its oversight function. These reforms could include the establishment of mechanisms that allow the DPD to enforce its recommendations or impose sanctions on regional governments that fail to comply with its oversight (Gunawan, 2023; Asyrofuddin, 2022). Strengthening the DPD's oversight authority would enable it

to play a more significant role in ensuring that regional policies align with the interests and needs of the communities it represents. This, in turn, would enhance the effectiveness of the DPD within Indonesia's legislative and regional governance processes (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023).

In practice, the DPR continues to hold a dominant position in determining policies that affect regional governance, often sidelining the DPD's consultative role. The DPD's authority to propose and discuss bills related to regional autonomy is not proportional to the decision-making power held by the DPR. This discrepancy can lead to a lack of effective representation for regional interests in national policy discussions (Wardani, 2023; Imran et al., 2020). This imbalance has fueled debates over whether the DPD should be maintained in its current form or restructured to play a more significant and distinct role in the legislative process (Dorisara, 2024).

To address these challenges, enhanced coordination between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD) is necessary. Improved coordination will ensure that regional policies are better integrated and that the functions of both institutions do not overlap unnecessarily. Closer collaboration can create a more cohesive legislative approach, ensuring that both national and regional interests are more evenly represented while strengthening the legislative process in Indonesia (Ryantoni, 2024; Nirmala, 2023). Furthermore, reforms granting DPD more substantial legislative authority can enhance its effectiveness and relevance, allowing it to contribute more significantly to regional governance issues (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023).

The limited authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia, particularly regarding

budgetary matters, poses a significant obstacle to its effectiveness in advocating for regional interests. Currently, DPD has no authority to discuss the State Budget (APBN), even though the budget plays a crucial role in determining regional needs and development priorities. This limitation is a serious issue, given that DPD's primary role is to represent regional interests at the national level, while budgetary decisions directly impact regional development and welfare (Wardani, 2023; Bakir, 2023).

In many bicameral systems worldwide, upper houses generally play an important role in budget discussions, particularly in allocating funds across different regions. For example, in countries like Canada and Australia, the upper house has significant influence in shaping budget policies, ensuring a more equitable distribution of resources across territories (Parameswaran, 2017). In contrast, excluding DPD from the budgetary process in Indonesia weakens its ability to fulfill its mandate effectively and limits its role in advocating for the regions it represents (Wardani, 2023).

To strengthen DPD's role in budget planning, reforms are needed to grant it authority in budgetary processes. Such reforms could allow DPD to play a more active role in APBN discussions, ensuring that regional perspectives are adequately considered in national budget allocations. This step would not only enhance DPD's legislative and oversight functions but also increase its contribution to regional development and welfare (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023). By granting DPD a more substantial role in budgetary matters, the Indonesian government can create a more integrated regional policy approach and reduce the existing imbalance between DPR and DPD (Gandhi, 2020).

The novelty of this study lies in its comprehensive analysis of the power imbalance between DPD and DPR in

Indonesia's legislative system, highlighting that Indonesia's bicameral system functions more as a pseudo-bicameral system due to the lack of balanced authority between the two legislative bodies. Unlike previous studies that primarily focused on comparisons with bicameral systems in other countries, this research emphasizes the institutional and political factors that hinder DPD from effectively carrying out its role. Additionally, this study proposes specific institutional reform solutions, including mechanisms for DPD's involvement in budgetary processes and the strengthening of its legislative and oversight functions, aiming to provide concrete contributions to improving Indonesia's bicameral system.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. The Limited Authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia

The authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia is highly restricted, particularly in the legislative domain. According to Article 22D of the 1945 Constitution, the DPD only has the authority to propose draft laws, provide recommendations, and oversee the implementation of laws related to regional interests. However, the DPD does not have full authority to enact laws, rendering its legislative capacity highly limited (Wardani, 2023; Reza, 2020; Zada, 2015). This limitation stands in stark contrast to bicameral systems in other countries, where upper houses typically wield significant power in the legislative process, including budget discussions and law-making (Bakir, 2023; Hamudy & Rifky, 2020).

In many bicameral systems, such as those in the United States and Australia, the upper house plays a crucial role in

drafting legislation and overseeing budget allocations. For instance, the United States Senate holds significant authority over federal budget matters and can influence the legislative agenda, ensuring that regional interests are well represented (Parameswaran, 2017; Hamudy & Rifky, 2020). Conversely, the role of the DPD in Indonesia is more consultative, raising concerns about its effectiveness in advocating for regional interests in the national legislative system (Gandhi, 2020; Zada, 2015). This lack of authority has sparked debates regarding the relevance of the DPD and the need for reforms to strengthen its function and power (Benyal, 2020; Farhan & Mustakim, 2021).

Efforts to enhance the legislative authority of the DPD have been discussed, particularly through constitutional amendments and legal rulings aimed at clarifying its role (Reza, 2020; Zada, 2015). However, these reforms have yet to result in a significant increase in the DPD's legislative power, keeping its position subordinate to the DPR (Hau Wele, 2024; Farhan & Mustakim, 2021). The DPD's inability to participate substantially in the law-making process weakens its capacity to effectively represent regional interests, prompting calls for a reassessment of its function within Indonesia's bicameral system (Zada, 2015; Ariyanto, 2020).

The legislative function of the DPD is often perceived as symbolic, primarily because substantial decision-making power rests with the House of Representatives (DPR). This imbalance in legislative authority significantly affects the DPD's ability to effectively represent regional interests within the national legislative framework. Article 22D of the 1945 Constitution explicitly limits the DPD's authority to proposing draft laws,

providing recommendations, and overseeing the implementation of laws related to regional interests, without granting it the power to enact laws independently (Reza, 2020; Dorisara, 2024). Consequently, the DPD's role in the legislative process is often overshadowed by the DPR, which holds the primary authority in determining the fate of proposed laws (Gandhi, 2020).

This law regulates the functions and powers of these legislative institutions, and there have been growing demands for its amendment to strengthen the DPD's position in the legislative process (Amaluddin, 2021; Hamudy & Rifky, 2020). Proponents of reform argue that enhancing the DPD's legislative authority would enable it to play a more significant role in drafting laws that directly impact regional development and welfare (Gultom, 2024; Putra, 2022).

Although some constitutional reinforcements have clarified the DPD's role through Constitutional Court rulings affirming its authority to propose and discuss draft laws, the DPD still lacks sufficient power to influence the legislative process effectively (Reza, 2020; Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023). The DPD's dependence on collaboration with the DPR in legislative tasks further complicates its ability to advocate for regional interests, as it often finds itself in a weaker position (Wardani, 2023).

To address these challenges, reforms are needed not only to clarify the DPD's legislative function but also to strengthen its authority in the law-making process.

Such reforms could include granting the DPD a greater role in budget discussions and legislative drafting, ensuring that regional perspectives are more effectively integrated into national policymaking (Setiawan Sapii, 2022; Rosalina, 2021). By strengthening the DPD's legislative authority, Indonesia can

build a more balanced bicameral system capable of effectively responding to the diverse needs and aspirations of its regions (Setiono & Hapsoro, 2016).

The oversight authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia is marked by significant limitations, particularly in its ability to enforce its recommendations. Although the DPD is tasked with monitoring the implementation of laws related to regional autonomy, the outcomes of its oversight activities are non-binding. This lack of binding authority weakens the DPD's effectiveness in ensuring that regional interests are adequately represented and addressed within the national legislative framework (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023).

The DPD's oversight role is largely consultative, meaning that its recommendations lack the necessary power to compel action from other government bodies or the DPR. This situation severely limits the DPD's capacity to influence regional policies effectively, as its oversight function is often ignored or overridden (Reza, 2020). The inability to enforce its recommendations hampers the

DPD's efforts to advocate for regional interests, leading to calls for reforms to strengthen its authority and effectiveness (Aspani & Yusmanda, 2022).

Reforming the DPD's oversight authority is crucial to ensuring that its recommendations on regional policies carry greater weight. Such reforms could involve granting the DPD the authority to impose sanctions or enforce compliance with its recommendations, thereby enhancing its influence in the legislative process (Reza, 2020). By strengthening the DPD's oversight powers, the Indonesian government can establish a more balanced and effective legislative system that better responds to the needs

and aspirations of the country's diverse regions.

The Regional Representative Council (DPD) of Indonesia was established as part of constitutional reforms following amendments to the 1945 Constitution, aimed at enhancing regional representation within the legislative framework. The DPD was intended to serve as a counterbalance to the House of Representatives (DPR), advocating for regional interests in national policymaking. However, despite this objective, the DPD's authority remains limited, particularly in legislation, oversight, and budgetary matters, raising questions about its effectiveness as a regional representative body (Gunawan, 2023; Hamudy & Rifky, 2020; Hakim, 2020).

One of the main challenges faced by the DPD is its restricted legislative authority. Although constitutionally recognized as a legislative body, its powers are far more limited compared to the DPR. The DPD can only propose certain draft laws related to regional interests, but the final decision-making power over these proposals rests with the DPR (Monitasari et al., 2022; Melati et al., 2021). This restriction has led to criticism that the DPD lacks sufficient authority to effectively represent regional interests and influence national legislation (Kamela & Setyaningrum, 2020; Ryantoni, 2024).

Moreover, the DPD's oversight role is also constrained. While it is responsible for monitoring the implementation of laws and policies, its ability to enforce compliance or challenge decisions made by the DPR is limited. This lack of authority reduces the DPD's effectiveness in ensuring that regional interests are adequately considered in national governance (Wardani, 2023; Rusdiana,

2022). As a result, the DPD's capacity to fulfill its mandate as a representative body is frequently questioned, prompting calls for reforms to strengthen its authority and clarify its function within the legislative process (Marnianti Suhendar, 2024; Husen et al., 2022).

Political challenges further complicate efforts to amend the constitution to strengthen the Regional Representative Council (DPD). The existing power dynamics between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the DPD create resistance to changes that could enhance the DPD's authority. The DPR, as the more powerful chamber, may be reluctant to cede its authority to the DPD out of concern that it could diminish its legislative dominance (Nafisa, 2023; Gunawan et al., 2023). Additionally, reaching political consensus among various parties and stakeholders is crucial for any constitutional amendment, which can be challenging given the diversity of interests and agendas in Indonesian politics (Wibawa, 2024; Taqwa, 2024).

Indonesia's representative system has undergone significant changes since the amendments to the 1945 Constitution. Although Indonesia adopts a presidential system, there are inconsistencies in its implementation, with the president holding dominance over the House of Representatives (DPR) (Kuswanto, 2018). The Indonesian parliament has adopted modern political marketing strategies in the post-Soeharto era (Ahmad, 2017). Indonesia's bicameral legislative structure consists of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD), although the DPD's role and authority remain limited compared to the DPR (Andriyan, 2018). Unlike some other countries, Indonesia lacks a legal framework for certain social issues, such

as surrogacy, highlighting the need for more comprehensive legislation to address emerging challenges (Ambarwati & Kamila, 2019). These studies collectively indicate that Indonesia's representative system continues to evolve by balancing presidential power and legislative authority while addressing gaps in its legal infrastructure.

Indonesia's representative system, particularly through its bicameral structure consisting of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD), shares similarities with other bicameral systems but also exhibits unique characteristics. The DPD was established to ensure regional representation within the national legislative framework, similar to upper houses in other bicameral systems that serve the same function, such as the United States Senate or the Australian Senate (Hamudy & Rifky, 2020; Imran et al., 2020).

In many bicameral systems worldwide, the upper house is designed to represent regional or state interests, while the lower house typically represents the overall population. For example, in the United States, the Senate (upper house) has the authority to confirm presidential appointments and ratify treaties, whereas the House of Representatives (lower house) is responsible for initiating financial legislation (Miler, 2016). This division of responsibilities allows for a system of checks and balances, ensuring that both national and regional interests are considered in the legislative process. Similarly, the DPD was intended to represent regional interests in Indonesia, although its legislative powers are far more limited than those of the DPR (Hamudy & Rifky, 2020; Imran et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the role of the DPD reflects the function of upper houses in

other countries that prioritize regional representation. For instance, in Canada, the Senate serves as a representative body for provinces and territories, providing a platform for regional voices in national governance (Bridgman, 2020). However, the effectiveness of the DPD is often questioned due to its limited authority in legislative affairs, particularly when compared to the more dominant DPR (Imran et al., 2020; Sari Hayati, 2023). This limitation is a common issue in various bicameral systems, where upper houses often struggle to assert their authority over stronger lower houses (Garwe et al., 2021).

Political dynamics also play a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of a bicameral system. In many countries, the strength of the upper house can be influenced by political contexts, such as party dominance and electoral systems. In some parliamentary systems, upper houses may have limited legislative authority, making them dependent on lower houses for significant policy decisions (Rohmah, 2024; Wardani, 2023). In Indonesia, the DPD faces similar constraints, raising questions about its ability to fulfill its role as a body representing regional interests (Hayati, 2023; Zada, 2015).

B. Legislative, oversight, and budgeting functions of the DPD.

The issue of regional representation disparity in Indonesia's Regional Representative Council (DPD) stems from the constitutional framework established by the 1945 Constitution. The constitution allocates an equal number of representatives (four individuals) for each province, regardless of population size or territorial extent. This arrangement has resulted in significant disparities in representation, particularly disadvantaging provinces with larger populations. The DPD was established to

represent regional interests within the bicameral legislative system alongside the House of Representatives (DPR), but its current structure has been criticized for failing to reflect the demographic reality of the nation (Hamudy & Rifky, 2020; Imran et al., 2020; Haruni et al., 2020).

The DPD's limited authority and functions further exacerbate the issue of underrepresentation. Although intended as a forum for regional aspirations, the DPD lacks substantial legislative power, particularly in proposing bills or having a decisive role in the legislative process (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023; Dorisara, 2024; Trijono, 2018). This limitation is evident in the DPD's inability to influence major legislative decisions, diminishing its effectiveness as a representative body for diverse regional interests (Gandhi, 2020; Asyrofuddin, 2022). Consequently, the DPD is often perceived as secondary to the DPR, undermining the legitimacy and representation of provinces with large populations (Kosasih, 2024).

To address this disparity, an alternative, more proportional representation system could be considered. One possible reform is adjusting the number of DPD representatives based on population size, ensuring fairer representation for regions with larger populations. Such a system would align more closely with democratic principles of representation and could enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the DPD (Haruni et al., 2020; Kosasih, 2024). Additionally, expanding the DPD's legislative authority could empower it to advocate for regional interests, fostering a more balanced legislative process that reflects the diverse needs of Indonesia's provinces (Dorisara, 2024; Putra, 2022). The overlapping roles of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) and the House of Representatives

(DPR) within Indonesia's legislative framework raise critical questions about the urgency and effectiveness of the DPD. Both institutions are designed to represent regional interests, yet their functions often overlap, prompting debates on the relevance of the DPD and the need for a redefinition or enhancement of its role. DPR members are elected from specific electoral districts, meaning they also represent regional interests, creating redundancy in representation that some argue weakens the primary purpose of the DPD (Haruni et al., 2020).

Critics of the current system argue that the DPD's role is diminished because the DPR already functions as a regional representative body through its district-based electoral system. This overlap can create confusion regarding the distinct functions of each institution, leading to calls for reevaluating the DPD's role in the legislative process (Haruni et al., 2020). The DPD was initially intended as a platform for regional voices, particularly from less populous provinces, but its limited legislative authority and overlapping role with the DPR have raised questions about its necessity (Haruni et al., 2020).

To improve regional representation in Indonesia, several proposals have been made to strengthen coordination between the DPR and the DPD. This coordination can be achieved by clearly defining the functions of each institution to avoid redundancy and ensure that both effectively advocate for regional interests. For example, the DPD could focus on specific issues that receive less attention from the DPR, such as local governance and community development, while the DPR handles broader national legislative matters. This division of responsibilities could enhance the legislative process by

allowing each institution to specialize in its respective areas, ultimately improving governance and regional representation.

Furthermore, strengthening the DPD's legislative authority could enable it to play a greater role in shaping regional policies. This could be achieved by granting the DPD the power to propose bills related to regional development and local governance, ensuring that regional voices are not only heard but also have a tangible impact on policymaking. Such reforms would not only clarify the roles of the DPD and DPR but also strengthen the democratic process by ensuring that diverse regional interests are more effectively represented and accommodated within the legislative system.

The limited budgetary authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia is a major concern, particularly given its role in representing regional interests. The DPD lacks the authority to discuss the State Budget (APBN), significantly restricting its ability to influence financial decisions that directly impact regional development. This limitation raises questions about the DPD's effectiveness in advocating for its constituents' needs, considering that budget decisions are crucial for implementing policies and development programs (Nurhayati et al., 2020; Karianga, 2016).

The absence of budgetary authority prevents the DPD from engaging in meaningful discussions regarding fiscal allocations that affect regional governance and development projects. This situation creates an imbalance between the DPD's responsibilities and its authority, ultimately fostering a perception that the institution is ineffective in fulfilling its function as a regional representative body (Eka Sari et al., 2019; Pattiruhu, 2019). The DPD's exclusion from budget discussions also

weakens its capacity to advocate for necessary funding for regional projects, potentially hindering local development and exacerbating interregional disparities (Riharjo & Isnadi, 2018; Ramdhani & Anisa, 2017).

To address this limitation, steps should be taken to grant the DPD a greater role in budget planning and discussions. Providing the DPD with budgetary authority could enhance its effectiveness in representing regional interests and ensuring that local needs are considered in national budget planning. One possible reform is allowing the DPD to propose budget allocations for specific regional projects or involving it in budget discussions alongside the DPR (Nurhayati et al., 2020;

Karianga, 2016). Such reforms would not only strengthen the DPD's role but also promote accountability and transparency in the budgeting process, ultimately benefiting regional governance (Sari et al., 2019; Pattiruhu, 2019).

Additionally, increasing the DPD's role in budget planning could contribute to higher budget absorption rates, as regional representatives would be better positioned to advocate for resource allocations that align with local priorities (Plitt, 2023; Riharjo & Isnadi, 2018). This alignment is crucial to ensuring that budgetary resources are utilized effectively to meet development needs across various regions, thereby fostering more balanced growth nationwide (Ramdhani & Anisa, 2017; Mbado & Mbate, 2022).

Comparing regional representative bodies like Indonesia's Regional Representative Council (DPD) with bicameral systems in other countries reveals significant differences in structure, authority, and effectiveness. Bicameral systems are designed to balance representation and power, typically consisting of an upper and a lower house with distinct roles. In many

federal systems, such as in the United States and Brazil, the upper house usually represents states or regions, while the lower house represents the population more directly (Wardani, 2023; Ali, 2023). This structure allows for more detailed representation of diverse interests, which is crucial for large and heterogeneous nations.

Conversely, the DPD in Indonesia is often criticized for its limited authority and overlapping functions with the lower house, the DPR. The DPD is supposed to represent regional interests but lacks significant legislative power, particularly in budget discussions and lawmaking processes (Imran et al., 2020; Hamudy & Rifky, 2020). This situation creates what is known as "weak bicameralism," where the DPD is often seen as redundant rather than complementary to the DPR (Imran et al., 2020).

Coordination between the two parliamentary chambers is also a crucial factor in the effectiveness of a bicameral system. In many countries, there are clear mechanisms for cooperation and negotiation between the upper and lower houses, which help streamline the legislative process and ensure that diverse interests are represented (Garwe et al., 2021; Costello & Thomson, 2016). However, in Indonesia, the lack of clear delineation of functions and powers between the DPR and the DPD often leads to confusion and inefficiency (Imran et al., 2020; Kosasih, 2024).

To enhance the effectiveness of the DPD, various proposals have been put forward, including strengthening its role in budget planning and the legislative process, as seen in other bicameral systems (Nurhayati et al., 2020; Mbado & Mbate, 2022). Strengthening the DPD's authority could improve the representation of regional interests and

create a more effective government, aligning it more closely with the successful elements of bicameral systems in other countries (Kosasih, 2024; Tatsiy & Serohina, 2018).

Indonesia's bicameral system, consisting of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) and the People's Representative Council (DPR), faces challenges in achieving a balance of power. Although the DPD is tasked with representing regional interests, its authority remains limited compared to the DPR (Alkadri, 2016). Efforts to strengthen the DPD's position through constitutional amendments and judicial reviews at the Constitutional Court have not succeeded, leading to considerations of alternative strategies such as a constitutional convention (Kosasih et al., 2024). Proposed reforms include expanding the legislative and oversight powers of the DPD and restructuring the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as a joint assembly for both parliamentary chambers (Andriyan, 2018). Globally, bicameral systems provide more detailed legislative oversight but tend to be slower in decision-making compared to unicameral systems. The choice between the two impacts political stability, the legislative process, and representation, as evidenced in countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States (Qerimi & Pajaziti, 2024).

The Regional Representative Council (DPD) of Indonesia, established after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, was intended to strengthen the bicameral system (Kosasih et al., 2024; Mamang, 2020). However, the DPD's authority remains limited compared to the People's Representative Council (DPR), particularly in legislative functions (Andriyan, 2018; Alkadri, 2017). Efforts to enhance the position of

the DPD have included formal amendments and judicial reviews at the Constitutional Court, but these have not resulted in significant changes (Kosasih et al., 2024).

Proposed changes to strengthen the DPD include granting it legislative, oversight, and evaluative powers, as well as participation in all bill discussions and the right to propose bills related to regional affairs (Andriyan, 2018). Some have also proposed restructuring the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to function as a joint institution for both the DPR and the DPD (Andriyan, 2018). Despite these proposals, political challenges remain the main obstacle to amending the constitution to establish a strong and balanced bicameral system between regional and national interests (Mamang, 2020; Kosasih et al., 2024).

Efforts to amend the 1945 Constitution to strengthen the Regional Representative Council (DPD) have been a significant topic of discussion among academics and policymakers. The DPD, established to represent regional interests within the national legislative framework, faces challenges regarding its authority and effectiveness, particularly in legislative and oversight functions. The proposed amendments aim to enhance the role of the DPD, allowing for greater involvement in the legislative process and regional governance (Reza, 2020; Gandhi, 2020).

One of the key proposals in the constitutional amendment is to expand the legislative authority of the DPD, enabling it to propose and discuss bills related to regional interests more effectively. Currently, the DPD's power is limited, as it can only propose specific bills to the DPR (People's Representative Council), which then decides whether to proceed with them (Dorisara, 2024). This limitation has sparked calls for reform to grant the DPD a greater role in shaping

policies that directly impact regional development and governance (Gandhi, 2020).

Furthermore, strengthening the DPD's oversight authority is another crucial area for reform. Enhancing this function would allow the DPD to more effectively monitor the implementation of laws and policies, ensuring that regional interests are better represented in national decision-making processes (Wartoyo & Prasetyo, 2023). The proposed constitutional amendment is expected to clarify the role and responsibilities of the DPD, reducing the ambiguities that have hindered its effectiveness (Asyrofuddin, 2022).

However, political challenges remain a significant barrier to amending the constitution and strengthening the bicameral system. The power dynamics between the DPR and the DPD create resistance to changes that would increase the DPD's authority. As the more dominant institution, the DPR is generally reluctant to transfer some of its powers to the DPD, fearing it would weaken its control over the legislative process (Hamudy & Rifky, 2020). Additionally, differing political perspectives on the urgency and impact of the amendment further complicate the legislative process (Putra et al., 2022).

Another major challenge is the need for broad political consensus to amend the constitution. Reaching an agreement among various political parties and stakeholders is not easy, especially when their interests diverge. The complexity of

Indonesia's legislative process, coupled with the requirement of a supermajority to pass constitutional amendments, further complicates these reform efforts (Hamudy & Rifky, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The authority of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) in Indonesia is still very limited, particularly in the areas of legislation and oversight. Compared to bicameral systems in other countries, the DPD does not have full power in the formation of laws or oversight of regional policies, which often results in its role being seen as symbolic. The disparity in authority between the DPD and the DPR has sparked debates about the need for reform, including strengthening its legislative and oversight functions so that the DPD can be more effective in advocating for regional interests. Constitutional and political revisions are needed to create a balance in Indonesia's bicameral system, allowing the DPD to play a more significant role in the legislative process and national decision-making. The imbalance in representation within the DPD is caused by a disproportionate electoral system and its limited powers, leading to doubts about its effectiveness in advocating for regional interests. The overlap of functions with the DPR further weakens its role, while bicameral systems in other countries show how upper chambers can contribute more significantly to the legislative and budgeting processes. Reform is needed, both in terms of representation and authority, so that the DPD can function more effectively and equitably within Indonesia's legislative system.

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